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A Fragment of Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti*

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In memory of Prof. K.C. Pandey

In what one imagines as being the long catalogue of the lost works of Indian philosophical literature the *Īśvarapratyabhijña-vivṛti* or *-ṭīkā* would deserve a prominent place. It is the longest of the two commentaries that Utpaladeva devoted to his own *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā*, the fundamental text of the Pratyabhijñā school, which formed the theoretical basis for that vast and multiform philosophical-religious movement known as Kashmir Shaivism.

Mādhava in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* thus defines the *Pratyabhijñā-śāstra*, quoting a verse from Madhurāja Yogin's *Śāstraparāmarśa* (1):

> sūtraṃ vṛttir vivṛtir laghvī bṛhatyubhe vimarśinyau |
> prakaraṇavivaraṇapañcakam iti śāstraṃ pratyabhijñāyāḥ ||
> 'Five commentaries on the Treatise [the *Śivadṛṣṭi*] constitute the corpus of the authoritative Pratyabhijñā texts and these are the *sūtra* [IPK], the *vṛtti*, the *vivṛti* and the two *vimarśinīs*, the long one [IPVV] and the short one [IPV]'

The interrelationship between these works is outlined by Abhinavagupta in the IPV and further explained by Bhāskara in his sub-commentary:

> śrīmān utpaladevaḥ svagurunirmitaṃ śivadṛṣṭyākhyaṃ mahārahasyaśāstraṃ vyākhyāya tatpratibimbakalpaṃ kārikāmayam īśvarapratyabhijñākhyaṃ mahāśāstraṃ praṇīya tattātparyasya durbodhatām āśaṅkya tanmātraparāṃ laghupratyabhijñākhyāṃ vṛttiṃ ca kṛtvā tatrāpi mandabuddhyanugrahārthaṃ madhyapratyabhijñākhyāṃ vivṛtiṃ kṛtavān | tatra ca sarvajanahitārthaṃ śrīmatābhinavaguptācāryeṇa bṛhatpratyabhijñākhyā bahuvistarā ṭīkā kṛtā | tadvicaraṇe ca janam aśaktaṃ jñātvā tenaiva pratyabhijñākārikāsūtreṣu saṃgrahamayī vimarśinīti prasiddhā ṭīkā kṛtā || (*Bhāskarī* I, pp. 2-3)
> 'After having commented upon the *Śivadṛṣṭi*, Utpaladeva wrote the IPK, which is like the reflection of it. Then, considering its import difficult to understand, he

(1) Verse 4. A MS of this work, in *telugu* characters, is preserved in the Government Oriental MSS Library, Madras.

> composed the *vṛtti*, called *Laghupratyabhijñā*, which concerns only the significance of the *sūtras*; to elucidate this, as an aid for the feeble-minded, he wrote the *vivṛti*, known as *Madhyavimarśinī*. On the latter Abhinavagupta, for the good of all men, wrote an extensive commentary, called *Bṛhatpratyabhijñā*. Then, considering that its study would not be accessible to the average man, he composed a concise commentary on the *sūtras*, known as *Vimarśinī*'.

Thus neither the *vṛtti* nor the *ṭīkā* are really and truly commentaries on the *sūtras*, in the sense that they do not gloss them word for word. The *vṛtti* confines itself to presenting the content in another form and briefly pointing out its implications; the *vivṛti* takes the *kārikās* and the *vṛtti* as its starting point and often develops into far-reaching excursuses. As Abhinavagupta says in the IPV, after having dwelt at length on the meaning to be attributed to the causative *āsādya* in the first line of the IPK:

> iyati ca vyākhyāne vṛttikṛtā bharo na kṛtaḥ, tātparyavyākhyānāt | yad uktam 'saṃvṛtasautranirdeśavivṛtimātravyāpārāyām' | ṭīkākāreṇāpi vṛttimātraṃ vyākhyātum udyatena nedaṃ spṛṣṭam, asmākaṃ tu sūtravyākhyāne eva udyama iti vibhajya vyākhyātam (IPV I, p. 39)
> 'The writer of the Vṛtti has not taken the trouble of giving such a detailed explanation, because his object was simply to state the implication. This is what has been said: - "In the Vṛtti which is intended to explain briefly what is obscure in the aphorisms". The writer of the Ṭīkā also, being concerned with the exposition of the Vṛtti only, has not touched this point. We have, however, explained it in detail, because our attempt is to give a full exposition of the aphorism'. (Transl. Pandey 1954, pp. 7-8)

The *kārikās*, the *vṛtti* and the *ṭīkā* represent three distinct and relatively autonomous stages in the exposition of the Pratyabhijñā doctrine and, accordingly, it is as though Utpaladeva has taken three different roles (*bhūmikā*) — *kārikā°* or *sūtrakāra*, *vṛttikāra* and *ṭīkākāra* (2) — almost three different persons, capable of dialoguing and disputing with each other, and yet remaining within the higher unity of the *granthakāra* or *śāstrakāra*. The *kārikās*, the *vṛtti* and the *ṭīkā* are seen by Utpaladeva in the *ṭīkā* — as we can gather from the IPVV — as respectively linked to the three planes of Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī on which the Supreme Word (Parāvāc) is articulated. On the supreme plane the essence of the doctrine still lies in the consciousness of its author Utpaladeva, undivided from Śiva, and it is given the name of 'heart', precisely because of its quintessential nature. On the Paśyantī plane it takes the form of *sūtras*, insofar as a differentiation begins to be outlined (*āsūtraṇā*), which is necessary if it is to become an object to be taught and explained to other men. Then, on the Madhyamā plane, the essence is disclosed (*unmīlita*) in the *vṛtti* and finally, on the Vaikharī plane — which corresponds to the *vivṛti* —, having now become clear through the refutation

(2) Cf. IPVV I, pp. 2-3. See also Gnoli 1956.

of the opponents' possible objections, it is fully differentiated and thus accessible to the comprehension of all (3).

To this distinction between the planes of the doctrine corresponds the diversity of levels in the recipients of the teaching. Both the *sūtras* and the *vṛtti* are aimed at those who are not impregnated with the latent traces of their earlier adhesion to other doctrines. The study of the *sūtras-vṛtti* as a whole prepares them for the subsequent phase which consists in the study of the *sūtras* alone, independently of the *vṛtti*. On the contrary, those who are under the influence of erroneous conceptions deriving from the profession of different doctrines are obliged to follow the whole course beginning with the *ṭīkā*. When the *ṭīkā* has removed these errors, they can have access to the *sūtras* accompanied by the *vṛtti*, and subsequently to the *sūtras* taken alone, until they reach the heart of the doctrine in identity with the consciousness of the *śāstrakāra* ... (4).

The link between the *sūtras* and the *vṛtti* is a particularly close one. Despite the fact that they are presented as being artificially differentiated, they substantially constitute a single work, since — according to Abhinavagupta — they were composed at the same time (*ekakālakṛta*) (5). Proof of this lies in the fact that the *namaskāra*, present in the *sūtras*, is not repeated at the beginning of the *vṛtti*, whereas it is in the *ṭīkā* (6).

In the subsequent history of Kashmir Shaivism the great figure of Abhinavagupta became so dominant that he overshadowed all the other masters, including even Utpaladeva. The MSS tradition furnishes an obvious proof of this, as we have a large number of MSS of Abhinavagupta's commentaries, particularly of the IPV, compared to the few of the *vṛtti* and none at all of the *ṭīkā*. None of the few extant *śārada* MSS of the *vṛtti* goes beyond the *kārikā* 2.9 of the *Āgamādhikāra* and, in fact, the KSTS edition, which, besides, is incorrect and almost illegible in many places, stops there.

(3) IPVV I, p. 16 yathā paravāktattve vibhāgahānyā viśvaṃ sthitaṃ, paśyantyām āsūtritabhedaṃ, madhyamāyām unmīlitabhedaṃ, vaikharyāṃ bhinnaparāmṛśyamānarūpatayā sphuṭībhūtabhedāvabhāsaṃ, [...] tathā paravāktattvasthāne śivābhinnaśāstrakārasaṃvedanaṃ [read °saṃvedana°] tādātmyena yat vartamānaṃ paramārthatattvaṃ sāratvāc ca hṛdayaśabdavācyaṃ, tat parapratipādyajanaviṣayatāpattiyogyatālakṣaṇasphuraṇātmakabhedāsūtraṇayā sthitaṃ sūtre, vṛttau tu tad eva unmīlitaṃ, vivṛtau tu ākṣepapratisamādhānadiśā sphuṭībhūtaṃ sarvajanapratipattiyogyatālakṣaṇabhedaṃ bhavatīti.

(4) *ibid.* tasya tasya adhikāriṇo vividhaphaladāyitayā hi agṛhītadarśanāntarajanitabhedavāsanāgrahāḥ sūtramātrāt vṛttisahitād abhivinītāḥ santo vṛttyanāpekṣasūtrārthamātrapariśīlanadiśā parāparasiddhibhājo jāyante | tīrthāntarapariśīlanotthitamithyādṛṣṭayas tu vivṛtirūpayā ṭīkayā apasāritatathāvidhavimohāḥ sūtravṛttyarthaviśrāntahṛdayāḥ krameṇa sūtrārthabhāvanāviyogaviśrāntyā tathaiva śāstrakārasaṃvedanarūpaparahṛdayāvibhaktatattvatayā siddhyantīti.

(5) *ibid.* sphuraṇanirvāhas tu vṛttāv iti paramārthata aikyam anayor ekakālakṛtatvāt, vibhāgakalpanayā tu bheda iti darśitam; *ibid.*, p. 183 evaṃ ca vadan sūtravṛttyor ekagranthatāṃ sphuṭayati.

(6) *ibid.*, pp. 2-3 namaskārāntarākaraṇātmikaiveyaṃ sūtrakārapūrvakasamanantara-tatsūtrapravṛttigranthakaraṇātmikā pravṛttir ācāryasya ekatāṃ gamayati anyathā evaṃbhūtaikapravṛttinirvāhāsaṃbhavāt | ṭīkākārapadam adhiśayānas tu śāstrakāro'vaśyaṃ pravṛttyantareṇa yujyate.

The only complete MS that I have been able to trace comes from Kerala and is in *malayalam* characters ([7]). Abhinavagupta's IPV ended up by eclipsing all the other commentaries and becoming the standard one, as we can see from the fact that it was the only one for which sub-commentaries were composed, such as Bhāskara's *vyākhyā* or the anonymous commentary in the Government Oriental MSS Library, Madras, and others which have only survived in fragmentary MSS, like the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vimarśinīvyākhyā* (University MSS Library, Trivandrum, No. 15413 C), the *Īśvarapratyabhijñākaumudī* of Bhaṭṭāraka Sundara (Centre of Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir, No. 1083) etc.

This situation is authoritatively echoed in the words of the first great modern exponent of these schools, Prof. K.C. Pandey:

> 'In fact the system owes the name Pratyabhijñā to this book [the IPK]. Its importance, however, is due to two commentaries of Abhinava, the Vimarśinī and the Vivṛti Vimarśinī' (Pandey 1963: 163).

A close examination of the IPVV is already sufficient in itself to limit the validity of this statement. Despite the inevitable difficulty in reading a text like the IPVV, which is an extensive and diffuse commentary on a work that has not come down to us, it seems clear that the majority of the themes and subjects that Abhinavagupta touches on find their direct correspondence — or at least their starting point — in Utpaladeva's *ṭīkā*. In fact the IPV itself, which according to Abhinavagupta is intended to be ([8]) a commentary on what the *kārikās* are in themselves, accomplishes its task through a carefully gauged and considered systematization of a rich speculative material whose early origin is to be glimpsed in the *ṭīkā*. Only a direct reading of the *ṭīkā* would allow one to define the central role that Utpaladeva undoubtedly played in the elaboration of Pratyabhijñā philosophy (see Torella, forthcoming A). For instance — to mention only two points — we must trace back to Utpaladeva the acceptance of the legacy from Bhartṛhari — of such great importance in the economy of the Pratyabhijñā school —, that had been on the contrary fiercely contested by his master Somānanda, and, secondly, the acknowledgement of the need to measure oneself against the Buddhist doctrines, particularly those of the school of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, who ended up by becoming both opponents and models.

At present, all that is known of the *ṭīkā* — apart from what one can glean from the IPVV, which is both a lot and a little — are a few brief quotations scattered through the works of Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja. Some passages in the footnotes of the KSTS edition of the IPV are also definitely from the *ṭīkā* and they must evidently have been in the margin of one of the MSS on which that edition was based. They

([7]) University MSS Library, Trivandrum, No. 8900 A.

([8]) IPV I, p. 39 asmākaṃ tu sūtravyākhyāna eva udyamaḥ.

are sometimes introduced by the expression *yathoktam aṣṭasāhasryām*, which allows us to have an idea of how long the work must have been, that is, the equivalent of eight thousand *ślokas* (six thousand, according to another tradition referred to by Pandey 1963: 163).

There was an intensified search for MSS of the *ṭīkā* when the KSTS edition of the IPVV was being prepared, but this proved fruitless (9). My attempts to find it, when I was preparing the critical edition of the IP*Vṛtti* (forthcoming), for which the text of the *ṭīkā* would have been an invaluable source of reference, were equally unsuccessful. All the indications given in the catalogues proved to be incorrect or misleading. For instance, the MS No. 466 (1876-78) of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Library, Poona, catalogued as '*Pratyabhijñāvimarśinī* by Utpala' turned out to be only a fragment (I.4.4. - II.3.9) of Abhinavagupta's IPV. In the description of the MS No. B. 167 of the Oriental Research Institute Library, Mysore, as given in the old catalogue, we read, among others, the intriguing expression '*utpaladevaviraciteśvarapratyabhijñāvyākyā*'; this MS, in *telugu* characters, contains in reality a large portion of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñānvayadīpikā* of Sādhānanda (Sadānanda ?), a commentary on the IPV (up to the VIII *āhnika*). Finally, also the MS of the Raghunath Temple Library, Jammu, catalogued even as '*Pratyabhijñāṭīkā* of Utpala', when I examined it, not without some excitement, unfortunately turned out to have nothing to do with the work in question. In Srinagar, some years ago, Pandit Dinanath Shastri told me of the existence of a fragmentary MS of 45 folios privately owned by a person who seemed willing to sell it. I was not able to see the MS, and now all trace of it seems to have been lost. According to Dinanath Shastri, the Indian Government has since bought it and it is now in the National Archives in Delhi. But during my visit to the National Archives in February 1988 I found no trace of it and I was told that there had not been any new MS acquisition for many years.

So I turned my search to a passage in Pandey (1963: 69-70):

> 'But the readers will be pained to know that Utpalācārya's Ṭīkā, on which it [the IPVV] is a commentary, has not so far been found in full in spite of vigorous searches made by so many enthusiasts. It was supposed to be irrecoverably lost.
> 'It is, however, a matter of very great satisfaction that the present writer, in the course of search for it in Kashmir, discovered a fragment of it. [...] We are trying to edit it and hope that if "He wills" it will be published in due course'.

(9) IPVV Preface, pp. I-II 'Although the above material was acquired and got prepared many years before now, yet it could not be utilised early in preparing the press copy of the work under edition because it was considered prudent to postpone it for some years and carry out in the meantime a vigorous search after the manuscript which could contain the complete gloss and commentary of Utpala Deva, both of which are in turn commented on exhaustively by Abhinava in the Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛtivimarśinī. In this direction I made every possible effort all the time I have been in association with the Research Department, but I could not succeed in coming across any manuscript which could satisfy my desire.' See also Rastogi (1979: 133-34).

That edition never saw the light of day. In the hope that the MS, or at least a transcript of it, might still be among the late Prof. K.C. Pandey's papers, I got in touch with Mrs Lila Pandey, the great scholar's widow and Honorary President of the Abhinavagupta Institute of Aesthetics and Śaiva Philosophy. Mrs Pandey very kindly received me at her home in Lucknow, in March 1987, and generously allowed me to examine at length the transcript of the MS in question made by Prof. Pandey himself (nothing is known of the whereabouts of the original) and to photograph it, though, unfortunatly, only in part. I should, therefore, like to take this opportunity of expressing my profound gratitude to Mrs Lila Pandey and also to the Trustees of the Abhinavagupta Institute.

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The transcript contains the part of the *ṭīkā* relative to IPK I.3.6 - I.5.3. It consists of the text of the *kārikās*, followed by that of the *vṛtti* on the *kārikās* and by that of the *ṭīkā* on the *kārikās* and the *vṛtti*; in addition there are also passages from Abhinavagupta's IPV scattered here and there.

The MS is described as follows by Prof. K.C. Pandey on the first page of the notebook that contains his transcription in devanagari:

> 'Leaves 33. Size 7 1/2 × 9 1/2'. Lines per page 19 approximately. Syll. per line 21. Handwriting almost recent. Written on local paper which does not seem to be old. 31st leaf worm eaten, it is clear from the note book pages 44, 45 and 46. The Ms. begins line no. 1, top: śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ; line two saṃskāre saty api etc. Ends abruptly as can be seen at page 49. Character Sharada.'

In his transcription Prof. Pandey has confined himself to faithfully copying the text, without any critical intervention, if one excepts the exclusion — always duly mentioned — of the passages from IPV.

In my edition I have made a few corrections to the text; some are purely dictated by the requirements of meaning, others are also corroborated by literal quotations or paraphrases found in the IPVV. In fact, the *ṭīkā* and the IPVV — a text without a commentary and a commentary without a text — elucidate one another: at times it is the IPVV that allows one to improve the text of the MS, but not infrequently it is the MS of the *ṭīkā* that points out errors in the edition of the IPVV. In any case, obviously, a parallel reading of the two texts renders both of them far more comprehensible. The punctuation is also mine. I have, besides, underlined all the passages and single words that Abhinavagupta quotes literally in the IPVV and added, between square brackets, the text of the *kārikās* and the *vṛtti* (according to my forthcoming edition) which the last two fragments refer to. The numbers that Prof. Pandey inserted in the transcript refer to the folios of the original MS.

The parts of the transcript that I was allowed to photograph and that I am publishing here consist in the whole text of the *ṭīkā* on IPK I.3.6-7, plus a part of

the *ṭīkā* on IPK I.4.2 and I.4.5 [10]. The main subject of these pages is the nature of cognition, understood as being self-luminous and absolutely unobjectifiable. This is one of the major themes running through Utpaladeva's whole work. He sets out from positions that for the most part coincide with Dharmakīrti's, but his ultimate aim is to show that they inevitably lead to a dead end — the only way to avoid this is by putting forward the idea of a world illuminated and dynamized by the I, as it is in Śaiva conception. The demonstration of the non-objectifiability of cognition is to be seen as a stage destined to lead to this conclusion. Among other topics which Utpaladeva deals with in these pages are some aspects of his *ābhāsa* theory; the yogi's superhuman faculty to penetrate other minds, which should, in the opponent's eyes, be a proof of the objectifiability of cognition; the Buddhist conception of the *anupalabdhi* etc. But I have already dwelt at length on these subjects elsewhere (Torella, forthcoming B).

[10] They are the pages 1-8, 22-23 e 32-33 of the transcript. I have photographed these last four pages in order to try to clarify some doubtful point of the *vṛtti*.

एवमन्योन्यभिन्नानामपरस्परवेदिनाम् ।

ज्ञानानामनुसन्धानजन्मा नश्येज्जनस्थितिः ॥ १.३.६ ॥

॥ वृत्तिः ॥ ज्ञानानि स्वात्ममात्रपरिनिष्ठितानि स्वसंविद्रूपतया नापरसंवेद्यानि तेषामन्योन्यविषयसङ्घटनामयः परमार्थोपदेशपर्यन्तो लोकव्यवहारः कथम् ॥

॥ विवृतिः ॥ व्यतिरिक्तर्थप्रकाशनमपि ज्ञानानां स्वरूपमेव न त्वर्थस्य कोऽपि अतिशयः । तच्च तस्य रूपं नान्यस्य ज्ञानस्य स्वरूपतामेति येनान्यविषयेऽन्यस्यापीति विषयमेलनं स्यात् । तदाह 'ज्ञानानि स्वात्ममात्र'इति । तदपि तथाभूतं ज्ञानं स्वातन्त्र्येण भिन्नमर्थं विषयीकुर्यात् न त्वन्यज्ञाने संवेदनमुखेन ज्ञानानां ज्ञानान्तरैरसंवेदनात् परप्रकाशतायां जडतापत्तेः स्वसंविद्रूपतयैवेत्याह 'स्वसंविद्रूपतया' इति । स्वसंविद्रूपत्वाज्ज्ञानानि परसंवेद्यानि न भवन्तीति कुत एतत् ।

को हि विरोधः स्वसंविद्रूपत्वपरसंवेद्यत्वयोः । यद्यपि ज्ञानं प्रकाशरूपत्वात् स्वयं प्रकाशते, तथापि परभूतस्यापि ज्ञानस्य प्रकाशे तज्ज्ञानानामा[1]त्मानात्मप्रकाशनसामर्थ्यात् अनात्मा च यथा जडः प्रकाश[२]नीयस्तथा प्रकाशरूपमपि ज्ञानं परं सत् प्रकाश्येतैव । यदपि च तत् प्रकाश्यते ज्ञानं तदप्यनात्मरूपं नीलादि प्रकाशयदेव ज्ञानान्तरेण प्रकाश्यतेऽत एव स्मृतिज्ञानेनानुभवो योगिज्ञानेन वा परप्रमातृसम्बन्धि ज्ञानं विषयसहितमेव प्रकाश्यते । तावता ज्ञानं प्रकाशितं भवति, न हि ज्ञानस्य परप्रकाश्यत्वे सति घटादिजडतुल्यतापत्त्या [2]ज्ञानत्वहानिः शङ्क्या परप्रकाशकस्य सतो ज्ञानस्य प्रकाश्यमानत्वाद्धटादेश् च तद्रूपत्वाभावात्, न हि जडार्थः परप्रकाश्यत्वाज्जडः बोधश् चापरप्रकाश्यत्वाद् बोधः, प्रकाश्यत्वाप्रकाश्यत्वयोर्विषयस्वरूपानुप्रवेशाभावात् । प्रमातृस्वरूपविषया एव ह्यर्थस्य प्रकाश्यता नतु निजमेव रूपमित्याह प्रमातृनियमो न स्यात्, यथा च घटस्य प्रकाशमानता स्वगतजडत्वाजडत्वावधीरणेनैव

(1) MS *ātmanātmaprakāśana*°; my correction is required by meaning (cf. also the parallel argumentation in IPVV I, p. 255 *ātmaprakāśananāntarīyakaparaprakāśanayogāt ātmānātmaprakāśanarūpam asyānapetam eva*).

प्रमातृसम्बन्धिना प्रकाशेन तथा ज्ञानमपि [3]न स्वप्रकाशेन प्रमातुः प्रकाशते जडं प्रति तस्य प्रकाशनप्रसङ्गादपि तु ज्ञानान्तरप्रकाशेनैव, यत एव च प्रकाश्यस्य ज्ञानप्रकाशः प्रकाश्यता ततो घटानुभवविषयो यावत् स्मृतिज्ञाने प्रकाशते तावदनुभवस्य प्रकाशत्वमपि प्रकाशितमेव। तत्प्रकाश एव हि परप्रकाशः । तदेवं ज्ञानं प्रकाशात्मत्वात् परप्रकाशनस्वभावत्वाच्च स्वात्मना प्रकाशते परं च प्रकाशरूपं जडरूपं वा प्रकाशयेदिति ज्ञानान्तरेणाप्येवं स्वपरप्रकाशकेन तत्स्वरूपप्रकाशकरत्वभावं प्रकाश्येतापि नात्र कश्चिद्बाधः । अत्रोच्यते। यथा पृथुबुद्नोदराकारे रूपे प्रकाशमाने घटः प्रकाशितो भवति आतानवितानवति च पटः नतु विपर्यये सति, तथा ज्ञानमपि यदा स्वप्रकाशं सत् परप्रकाशकत्वेन प्रकाशते तदा प्रकाशितं भवति तथाभूतैकरूपत्वात् , ज्ञाने च ज्ञानान्तरेण प्रकाश्यमानेऽपि स्वप्रकाशत्वमस्य न [4]प्रकाश्येतैव, स्वप्रकाशत्वं हि प्रमातृमय-प्रकाशाव्यतिरेकित्वमहमिति [5]प्रत्येयम् । तदिदं ज्ञानमिति प्रतीतौ

(2) MS *jñāni°*.

(3) MS omits *na* (without which the whole passage would be meaningless) and reads *svakaprakāśena*. I have accepted the reading *na svaprakāśena*, as cit. *ibid.*, p. 256.

(4) MS *prakāśyataiva*, perhaps not impossible.

(5) *ibid.*, p. 257 cit. *°pratyeyaḥ*.

स्वप्रकाशैकरूपं ज्ञानं न प्रकाशितं स्यात्, बोधो हि स्वप्रकाशैकरूपोऽहमित्ये[६]व प्रकाशार्हः अहमित्यस्यैव [७]प्रकाशवादित्वात् [?], स एव हि यदा त्वर्थोन्मुखस्तदार्थभेदाद्भिद्यमान इव ज्ञानव्यपदेश्यः । यदा त्वन्तर्मुखतया व्यवस्थितस्तदा प्रमाता कथ्यते सौगतैरपि विकल्पारोपि[३]तस्थैर्यः केवलं, न त्वन्यः । साङ्ख्यानामपि बुद्धावेवैकस्यां प्रकाशमानायां मुख्यया वृत्त्योभयरूपोऽयं व्यवहारः । येषामपि ज्ञानप्रकाशातिरिक्तः प्रमाता तेषामपि प्रमातृसमवायादयुतसिद्धत्वाज्ज्ञानं प्रमात्रभेदेनैव प्रकाशेतान्यथा ज्ञानमेव न स्यात्, नहि जातिर्व्यक्तेः पृथगवतिष्ठमाना जातिर्भवति पृथक् प्रकाशमाना वा जातिः प्रकाशिता भवति । सर्वज्ञस्यापि जातिः प्रकाशमाना स्वलक्षणोपरञ्जकत्वेनैव प्रकाशितुमर्हति, तद्वज्ज्ञानमपि प्रमात्रभेदेनाहंप्रकाशमयमेव प्रकाशमानं प्रकाशेत (नत्विदमिति प्रत्यया[८]व्यतिरेकेण प्रकाशमानं) स्वयं यथाभूतं [९]यदहंप्रकाशमयं तथाभूतमेव तत् प्रकाशितं भवेत् ।

(6) *eva* cit. and commented upon *ibid.*, p. 257 *evagrahaṇena anyonyāpekṣām āha | aham ity eva prakāśārhaḥ sa eva hīti sambandhaḥ.*

(7) The meaning of this expression is not clear to me.

(8) MS reads °*vyatirekeṇa*, which is apparently meaningless in this context.

(9) MS *tad.*

अहंप्रकाशमात्ररूपो हि प्रमाता, विषयोन्मुखाहंप्रकाशमात्ररूपं तु ज्ञानं नाधिकस्वरूपम् । एवं हि तद्विषयव्यवस्थितीनां निष्ठा भवति व्यतिरिक्तप्रकाशौन्मुख्याभावेन स्वातन्त्र्यात् । तदेव चेन्न प्रकाशितं किमन्यत् ज्ञानस्यावशिष्यते यत्तत्र प्रकाशेत । तदिदमिति ज्ञानं प्रतीतं न साक्षात् प्रतीतं भवति, अपितु प्रागुक्तन्यायेनायमात्मेति प्रमातेवाहं-प्रकाशव्यवधानेन प्रतीतं स्यात् । तस्मात् साक्षाद्यथास्वरूपं ज्ञानं ज्ञानान्तरस्यासंवेद्यमेव ज्ञानत्वात् स्वसंविद्रूपत्वात् । अत एवेदानीं जडाजडलक्षणं व्यवतिष्ठते यदिदं तथा प्रकाशते । तत् पराधीनप्रकाशं जडमितरदहम्प्रकाशमयं स्वप्रकाशमजडम् , अन्यथा पराधीनप्रकाशं यत्प्रकाश्यं तज्जडमुच्यते । तस्य प्रकाश्यत्वेन स्वरूपसंस्पर्शो न कृतः, प्रकाश्यत्वमर्थस्य प्रमातृसम्बन्धी प्रकाशो नतु स्वरूपमिति हि उक्तम्। नच स्वरूपासंस्पर्शि लक्षणं भवति ततश्च तज्जडाभिमतप्रकाश्यं पराधीनप्रकाशमपि सदजडस्वभावं स्यात् । [10]अतश्च स्याद्येनाजडा-भिमतज्ञानमपि ज्ञानान्तरसंवेद्यत्वप्रतिक्षयात् पराधीनप्रकाशत्वनिष्ठम् । अस्य पुनः पराधीनप्रकाशत्वमिदन्तया [11]प्रथमानमिदन्ता च

(10) MS reads *ataś cāsyādyena*, then corrected into *ataś ca syād yena*.

(11) My conjectural correction for MS *prathamam*, apparently meaningless.

प्रकाशभिन्नम् [12]अद्यार्थस्वरूपम् एवाहंप्रकाशमयस्वप्रकाशताविरुद्धमिति जडाजडलक्षणविभागः सुव्यवस्थितो भवति । पूर्वानुभूतस्य च स्मरणकाले स्मरणज्ञानमेवानुभवैक्यापन्नम् अनुभूतता, नत्वन्तराल[13]वर्ती स्मरणातिरिक्तोऽनुभवः, तस्य प्रकाशरूपत्वासिद्धौ परप्रकाशकत्व-स्याप्यसिद्धेः, नहि परं प्रकाशयतीति परस्य कश्चिदतिशयो, अपितु प्रकाशस्यैव । तत् प्रकाशरू(४)पता सा इदन्तयान्योन्मुखत्वेन स्वयंप्रकाशत्वासिद्धौ न स्यात् पूर्वानुभवस्य। एवं च ईश्वरस्य भावा इदन्तया प्रथमाना जडाः [14]प्रसक्ताः अहम्प्रकाशसामानाधिकरण्येन प्रमातृमयप्रकशस्वरूपतामापद्यन्ते तदा च बोधरूपताया नाधिक्यं किं-चित्, यथा हि रूपस्य सन्निवेशो नाम न पदार्थान्तरमपितु रूपपरमार्थ एवासौ तद्भ्रंशे च न किंचिद् भ्रश्यति रूपस्य तदवस्थत्वात्, नापि तदुद्भवे रूपस्याधिक्यं किंचिदर्थान्तरानुत्पत्तेः, केवलं तत्तत्सन्निवेशदशासु तथा तथा रूपं स्यात्, तस्यैव सातिशयस्य भावान्नत्वेवमपि बोधरूपे कश्चिदतिशयः सम्भवतीति । विश्वात्मापीश्वरो न चिन्मात्रताया अतिरिच्यते । तदास्ताम् एतत् ।

(12) *adya*, omitted in MS, is cit. and commented upon *ibid.*, p. 262 *'adya' iti asmaduktāyāṃ vyavasthāyām | 'arthasvarūpam' iti ...*

(13) MS *°varti°*.

(14) Doubtful reading in my photograph.

सिद्धं तावत् [१५]परसंवेद्यता व्यापकेदन्तास्वभावजडताविरुद्धाहम्प्रकाश-व्याप्तत्वं स्वसंविद्रूपत्वस्य । तेन ज्ञाने व्यापकविरुद्धव्याप्तायाः परसंवेद्यताया निषेधः, यथा शब्दादौ नित्यत्वव्यापकैक[१६]स्वभावत्व-विरुद्धानेकस्वभावत्वव्याप्तेन क्रमिकार्थक्रियाकारित्वेन नित्यत्वस्य, घटस्याप्यनयैव व्यापकविरुद्धव्याप्तपरसंवेद्यतोपलब्ध्या स्वसंविद्रूपत्व-निषेधः ।

तदेवं परसंवेद्यत्वाभावे ज्ञानानामन्योन्यसंवेदनाभावादशेषविश्वसं-वेदनेऽपि परविषयत्वेनावेदनात् पूर्वदृष्टत्वेन संवेदनस्यानुपपत्तेस्तत्त-दर्थक्रियासाधनत्वेनानिश्चयात् त्यागोपादानमयोऽर्थेष्वर्थिनां वर्त-मानज्ञानमात्रेण व्यवहारो न स्यात् । तदाह अन्योन्येति । 'ज्ञानानां' इति सूत्रेऽनुसन्धानापेक्षया वृत्तौ [१७]च विषयसङ्घटनापेक्षया षष्ठी तदपेक्षयापि च [१८]समासो नित्यसापेक्षत्वात् । विदितवेद्यैरपि यावत्तत्त्वमुपदिश्यते तावत्तत्राप्ययमेव क्रमः, तेऽपि हि विदितपूर्वम् एवा[१९]र्थम् एवमयम् इति तदानीं परामृशन्तः शिष्येभ्योऽप्युपदिश्यन्ति

(15) *Ibid.*, p. 265 cit. *'parasaṃvedyatā bodhasya'*, where *bodhasya* is most likely a scribal gloss.

(16) MS *°svabhāva°*.

(17) *ca*, omitted in MS, cit. *ibid.*, p. 268.

(18) MS reads *na samāso*, but this is against the grammatical argument Utpaladeva is referring to (*nityasāpekṣatva* does allow *samāsa*).

(19) MS *arthamavemayad iti*; I have accepted the reading cit. *ibid.* p. 269.

नतु तेषामपि लोकयात्रा स्वात्मविषयमात्रा[२०]वलम्बनैर्ज्ञानैरिति सर्व एव प्रमातरो [२१]निस्तिमिताः स्युः । तदाह परमार्थेति । परमार्थोपदेशस्यापि वा विप्लवत्वे परमार्थस्याप्तिर्न स्यात् । अथापि तथाभूताद्विप्लवादपि तथा नियता प्राप्तिः, ततोऽस्य न विप्लवत्वम् तथासामर्थ्ययोगान्न [२२]चेदं परमार्थस्य कारणमात्रमेवमुपदेशनमपितु प्रतीतिरेषा [२३]प्रतीतेश्च यदा भूतभविष्यत्परमार्थज्ञानविषयो न विषयः तदा कथं तत्र प्रवृत्तिः प्राप्तिपर्यन्ता स्यात् । तस्माद्केनियतनिबन्धनोऽयं व्यवहारो ज्ञानानामेकात्मकतां विना [२४] न स्यादेव ॥ १. ३. ६ ॥

॥ विवृतिः ॥ [२५]युज्येत पुनरेतादृशो व्यवहारो यद्येषामनुभव-स्मृत्यादीनां चिन्मात्रसारत्वेन एक एवात्मा स्यात् यस्यैव विश्वात्मनः परमेश्वरस्य [२६]एता ज्ञानादिका विचित्राः [२७]शक्तयोऽन्यथा तु न स्यादिति ।

(20) My conjecture for MS °*avalambanāya*, apparently meaningless; cf. *ibid.* p. 270 *'svātma' iti svaviṣayaprakāśatāyām ātmamātraprakāśatāyāṃ ca viśrāntair vartamānair evety arthaḥ.*

(21) *Ibid.* p. 270 cit. as *niḥstimitāḥ*

(22) MS *na cedaparamārthasya*; *na cedaṃ* cit. *ibid.*, p. 271.

(23) *Ibid.*, p. 271 cit., erroneously, *pratītiś ca.*

(24) *Ibid.*, p. 272 cit. — after *tasmād* and before *na syād eva* — *pratipadyate*, absent in MS.

(25) MS *yujyate*; the form *yujyeta*, grammatically more correct, cit. *ibid.*, p. 273, where Abhinavagupta dwells upon the meaning to be attributed to *liṅ* in this case.

(26) *etā*, cit. and commented upon *ibid.*, p. 273, is omitted in MS.

(27) After *śaktayaḥ*, *śaktiyogalakṣaṇam*, not found in MS, cit. *ibid.*, p. 273.

न चेदन्तःकृतानन्तविश्वरूपो महेश्वरः ।
स्यादेकश्चिद्वपुर्ज्ञानस्मृत्यपोहनशक्तिमान् ॥ १.३.७ ॥

॥ वृत्तिः ॥ चित्तत्त्वमेव विश्वरूपमतोऽतिरिक्तस्यानुपपत्तेः । अशेषपदार्थज्ञानानामन्योन्यानुसंधानमस्यैव ज्ञानादिकाः शक्तयः । 'मत्तः स्मृतिर्ज्ञानमपोहनं च' इति ह्युक्तम् ॥

॥ विवृतिः ॥ [28]प्रकाशरूपं हि चित्तत्त्वं कर्तृतामयमादिसिद्धमेव तद[29]तिरिक्तत्वे च नीलसुखादेर्जडा[30]भिमतस्य भावजातस्य स्वयम् अप्रकाशरूपत्वं स्यात् अतद्रूपत्वे च प्रकाशमानतानुपपत्तिः, न ह्यश्वेतरूपः प्रकाशः श्वेत इति भवति । एतच्च [31]उपपादयिष्यते । तदाह 'चित्तत्त्वमेवे'ति 'अतोऽतिरिक्तस्ये'ति च । भिन्नावभासिनाम् अपि चार्थानां चिदेकरूपत्वे तद्विषयाणां ज्ञानानामविवादसिद्धमेव

(28) MS *viśvarūpam*; I have accepted the reading *prakāśarūpam*, cit. and commented upon *ibid*. p. 273, which furnishes a more satisfactory meaning.

(29) My conjectural correction for MS °*atiriktatvam*, which does not fit the context.

(30) MS °*abhimatasvabhāvajātasya*; *abhimatasya* cit. *ibid*., p. 273.

(31) I accept the reading cit. ibid., p. 274, instead of MS *pratipādayiṣyatām*.

तदात्मकत्वम् । नहि तानि ततो भेदेन प्रथन्ते, [32]तथापि विषयभेदावकल्पितभेदानामपि तेषां विभिन्नदेशकालावच्छेदेऽप्येक-चिन्मयस्वभावविश्रान्तिरेव, अन्यथा सर्वेषामेव ज्ञानानामेकस्वसंवेदन-रूपान्तर्मुखचित्तत्त्वमयस्वभावाभावे केवलप्रदेशज्ञानप्रकाशसमये सघट-प्रदेशज्ञानं नास्तीति कथं निश्चियते ज्ञानानां स्वप्रकाशरूपतया घटादिविषयवदेकज्ञानसंसर्गित्वाभावात् । केवलप्रदेशे हि घटो यदि स्यात् तत्तत्र प्रदेशज्ञाने तुल्ययोग्यता[...]

* * *

[भासयेच्च स्वकालेऽर्थात् पूर्वाभासितमामृशन् ।
स्वलक्षणं घटाभासमात्रेणाथाखिलात्मना ॥ १.४.२ ॥

॥ वृत्तिः ॥ - स्मृतिशक्त्या स इति पूर्वानुभूतं स्वलक्षणं परामृशन्नाभासयत्येवान्यथा प्रकाशितस्य परामर्शो न कृतः स्यात् स्वसत्ताकाल एव च, तेन स्मरणकाले नष्टस्याप्याभासो न दुष्यति ।

(32) The reading *tathāpi*, cit. *ibid.*, p. 275, seems better than MS *tathāhi*.

कदाचित् त्वर्थितावशाद् घटकाञ्चनद्रव्यसत्ताद्यन्यतमैकाभासरूपेणैवास्य स्फुटोऽवभासः, अन्यदा तु सर्वात्मनार्थित्वेन तथैव । अतिशयनिरन्तरावहितचेतसस्तु दृष्टार्थप्रत्यक्षीकार एव ॥

॥ विवृतिः ॥ ...] ‹स्व›तन्त्रविकल्पेषु सामन्याकारस्यैवास्यास्फुटस्यावभासः । सामान्यान्येव हि प्रभूतानि सम्भूयान्योन्यावच्छेदेन व्यवस्थितानि स्फुटाभासतामासाद्य देशादिसामान्याभासावच्छेदेन स्वलक्षणतां भजन्ते । [३३]एकमपि तत्सामान्यरूपं शाखादिमत्वमात्रं वृक्षत्वं धवखदिरादिवर्णसंस्थानसामान्यवैचित्र्याभाससंमिश्रं देशकालाभाससामान्यसहस्रसम्भेदभेदितं चानेकात्मतामापद्यते । स्वयम् अदेशकालभेदत्वेऽपि परस्परं भेदः परस्परं पर्यायावच्छेदश्च सामान्यानामनेकस्वलक्षणतामापत्तिहेतुः तेषां चानुगुण्येनैवान्योन्यावच्छेदे भवति शीतसामान्याग्निसामान्ययोस्तथात्वाभावात् । [३४]किंचिच्च सामान्यम[३५]नन्यसामान्यावच्छेदेऽपि स्वत एवानेकसामान्यमयैकसामा-

(33) Cit. IPVV II p. 27 as *evam api*, apparently equally good, but Abhinavagupta's comment presupposes *ekam*, which is precisely the reading of MS.

(34) I have adopted the reading *kiṃcic ca*, cit. *ibid.*, p. 28, instead of MS *kiṃca*, which, however, might possibly equally stand.

(35) The expected meaning requires *ananyasāmānyāvacchede' pi* (or *anyasamānyānavacchede'pi*) instead of MS *atya* [read *anya*]*sāmānyāvacchede'pi*; cf. also *ibid.*, p. 28 *ābhāsāntareṇa aviśeṣitatve'pi*.

न्यात्मतया स्वलक्षणतामनापन्नमपि स्फुटं भवति यथा वृक्षत्वापेक्षया धवत्वादि । स्वभावत्वेन ह्यविशेषितमपि तद[३६]न्तःप्रविष्टवृक्षत्वादि, सामान्यतां[३७]नतु जहात्येव, देशकालभेदावच्छेदेनैव हि स्वलक्षणीभावः । यदा पुनर्थितावशेनैव सद्धटकाञ्चनलोहितत्वाद्याभाससंवेदनेनैव पूर्वदिक्कालाभाससंभेधिन एवार्थस्य स्मरणं तदा स्फुट एवाभासः । तदाह 'अन्यदा तु' इति । कदाचित् पुनरत्यन्तैकरसा[३८]वधानो-द्युक्तस्य निरवशेषविशेषणावभाससामानाधिकरण्यापत्तिविशदीकृतः स्मर्यमा(१६)णोऽर्थः साक्षात्कारमय एव स्फुटं पुरः स्फुरति । तदाह 'अतिशयनिरन्तर' इति । नैरन्तर्यमवधानस्य [३९]विजातीयचित्त-व्यवहाराभावो नैर्मल्यं । तदा [४०]च प्रत्यक्षीभावेऽपि पूर्वदृष्टतयैव प्रत्यक्षीभावादनुभूतविषयासम्प्रमोषः सुतराम् इति स्मृतिभेदमध्यगणनायां न क्षतिः । [४१]स्वतन्त्रोऽपि विकल्पस्तत्तत्प्रमाणपरिशुद्धानेकविशेषण-विशिष्टा[४२]र्थावभासोन्मुखो यदा भवति तदा स्फुटीभवत्येव सोऽर्थः ।

(36) MS *anta*°.

(37) *Ibid.*, p. 28 cit. *sāmānyaṃ tu* (but most probably *na* is only postponed).

(38) My conjectural correction for MS °*ādhāna*°.

(39) My tentative restoration of MS *vijātīyacittayā vyavahārābhāvanairmalyaṃ*, evidently corrupted.

(40) Cit., erroneously, *ibid.*, p. 30 as *tadā na*.

(41) Cit. erroneously, *ibid.*, p. 30 as *svatantre'pi*.

(42) MS °*avabhāsa*°; I have added °*artha*° — required by meaning — on the basis of Abhinavagupta's analysis of this long compound *ibid.* p. 30 ... *anekena viśeṣaṇena viśiṣṭo 'rthābhāso brahmādis tatra unmukhaḥ* ...

तदुक्तं ब्रह्मादिभाषणाकर्णनौन्मुख्यादिति । [43]तदा च [44]विकल्पता स्यान्निर्विकल्पता वेति[45] नास्माकं ग्रहः । परामर्शशून्यता तु न क्वचिदपि विद्यते तादात्म्यात् सर्वप्रकाशानां, सर्वत्र अनुस्मरणादौ च चित्तत्त्वस्यैव स्वातन्त्र्यं नतु स्वकारणसामर्थ्यात् तद्भवतीति प्रतिपादयितुं पूर्वाभासितमिति च णिचा निर्देशः [...]

* * *

[योगिनामपि भासन्ते न दृशो दर्शनान्तरे ।
स्वसंविदेकमानास्ता भान्ति मेयपदेऽपि वा ॥ १.४.५ ॥

॥ वृत्तिः ॥ सर्वज्ञानामपि प्रमात्रन्तरगतोपलम्भाः स्वसंविन्मात्रवेद्यस्वभावाः स्वात्मारूढा एव भासेरन्, अतश्च तेषां योगिनां परात्मतापत्तिरेव तत्त्वम् । प्रमेयकक्ष्यायामपि घटादिवत् प्रातिस्विकेन

(43) MS *tadā hi*.

(44) MS *vikalpaḥ*. The correction *vikalpatā* seems very probable, considering the following *nirvikalpatā*; cf. also *ibid.*, p. 30 *tat katham vikalpatā uktety āha 'tadā ca' iti*.

(45) After the quotation of *vā ibid.*, p. 31 follows the quotation of *pūrvāvasthāyām atibhāvyate*, referring possibly to a subsequent passage.

शुद्धबोधात्मना रूपेणावभासेरन्, यदि तथा सम्भवेत् ॥

॥ विवृतिः ॥ ...] तदा नास्य स्वैव संवित् नच स्वस्य तत् संविदेव स्यात्, अपितु परापेक्षप्रकाशनत्वात् पराप्यस्य संविदसंविदपि [४६]च तत् जडस्यैवंलक्षणत्वात् । तदा त्वेतावत् स्यात् परं योगिनं प्रत्युपस्थितं परप्रमातृज्ञानं स्वयमेव प्रकाशेत, [४७]तं प्रत्यस्यैवं ज्ञानलक्षणातिक्रमो न स्यात्, [४८]नत्वेतदपि उपपद्यते परेण सह सम्बन्धायोगात् । ज्ञानं च विषयालम्बनं सारूप्येणैव भवति नीलादेश्च ज्ञानविलक्षणरूपत्वात् तदनुकारेण ज्ञानस्य भेदाभेदनिबन्धनं सारूप्यमुपपद्यते, ज्ञानयोस्तु द्वयोर्विषयविषयिणोरेकबोधमात्रलक्षणत्वादभेद एवेति न सारूप्यमालम्बनार्थोऽनयोः, अपितु ऐक्यमेव। दर्पणयोः सर्वरूपवैलक्षण्यादन्योन्यसारूप्यं स्यात्, ज्ञानयोस्तु बोधरूपतातिरिक्तो देशकालयोगावेशविशेषोऽपि हि न सम्भवी । किंच यद्यथाभूतं तद्रूपेणैव ज्ञानं तदाकारं भवत् तद्विषयं

(46) *asaṃvid api ca* cit. ibid., p. 45 (the editor has not noticed it); *ca* is omitted in MS.
(47) *Ibid.*, p. 45 cit. *taṃ yoginaṃ prati, yoginaṃ* being most probably a gloss.
(48) *nanv etad api* cit. *ibid.*, p. 45; *api* omitted in MS.

भवेदनीला[४९]व्यवच्छिन्नेन हि नीलेन नीलाकारं ज्ञानं न तद्विषयं, ततश्च ग्राह्यव्यवच्छिन्नग्राहकैकस्वभावेन ज्ञानेन ज्ञानान्तरं तुल्याकारमेव स्यात्। यदि हि एकभाग एव [५०]निवेशयेदेतत् प्रमुषितस्वरूपं न कुर्यात् एव द्वयोरैक्या[५१]पत्त्यैव विषयविषयिभावः। तदाह 'स्वात्मारूढा एव' इति। [५२]स्वात्मा ज्ञानस्य ग्राहकांशः, परप्रमातृसम्बन्धि तु शरीरादि सर्वज्ञज्ञाने भेदेन ग्राह्यांश एवावभासते, तदभिप्रायेणैव तु परसत्तानुप्रवेशविषयं सर्वज्ञज्ञानमिति व्यवहारः। वास्तवेन तु बोधैकात्मना [५३]प्रमात्रा प्रमात्रन्तरैक्यापत्तिरेव [५४]परात्मवेदनं सर्वज्ञस्य तदाह 'योगिन [५५]परात्मतापत्तिरेव' इति नच प्रमात्रान्त-रैक्येऽपि सर्वज्ञस्य परसुखदुःखयोगः सुखादेर्वास्तवे प्रमातरि बोधैकलक्षणाहन्तामात्रप्रथात्मन्यसन्निवेशात्। मायीय एव बुद्ध्या-त्मनि प्रमातर्यहन्तेदन्ताप्रतीतिविषये तस्यावस्थितिरिति वक्ष्यते।

(49) My conjectural correction for MS *°vyavacchinnena*, which does not fit the context.

(50) I have accepted the reading of MS (but also a correction into *niveśayat* could be considered).

(51) MS *āpattyeva*.

(52) My conjectural correction for MS *svātma°*, meaningless in this context.

(53) I restore *pramātrā* (strictly required by meaning), most likely dropped by the scribe because of haplography (see the following *pramātrāntara°*).

(54) My conjectural correction, suggested by the requirement of meaning, for MS *paramātmavedanam*, and *paramātmavedakam* cit. *ibid.*, p. 47 (but cf. also ibid. *sarvajñāgrahaṇaṃ prāgupakrāntaparasaṃvedanopakramāt parātmavedakaparyāyātām etīty arthaḥ*). Also the MSS of the *Vṛtti* show this fluctuation between the readings *parātma°* and *paramātma°*.

(55) My correction for MS *paramātmatā°*.

अत एव ग्राहकभूमिकोत्तीर्णानां वास्तवप्रमातृदशासमापन्नानां तत्तत्स्वहेतूपस्थापितसुखदुःखसाक्षात्कारेऽपि न सुखित्वादि, तेषां नोत्पद्यत एव वा सुखादि हेतुवैकल्यात् । सहजानन्दाविर्भावस्तदा स्यात् । पूर्वजन्मान्तरप्रत्यक्षीकारेऽपि योगिनां जन्मा(२३)न्तरानुभूता[...]

'Thus the functioning of the human world — which stems precisely from the unification of cognitions, in themselves separate one from the other and incapable of knowing one another — would be destroyed ...' IPK I.3.6

(*Vṛtti*) — Cognitions are restricted to themselves only and cannot be the object of other cognitions, being by nature [exclusively] aware of themselves. But, in this case, how would the dimension of human activity and behaviour — culminating in the teaching of the highest reality —, which consists precisely in the connection with one another of the objects of cognition, be possible?

(*Vivṛti*) — Also the illumination of an object conceived as separate constitutes the own form of the cognition itself and not any further qualification (*atiśayaḥ*) for object. And this form of such cognition does not become the own form of another cognition, so that — through the identification with another cognition having a different object — the objects of different cognitions can combine (*viṣayamelanaṃ syāt*). Also a cognition thus conceived (1) would render a separate entity its object by operating autonomously and not through the perception of another cognition. In fact, a cognition cannot be perceived by another cognition, because it is only aware of itself (*svasaṃvidrūpatayā*). Otherwise, if illuminated [not by itself but] by something else, it would be nothing but an inert and insentient reality. This is meant by the *vṛtti* when it says: '... being by nature [exclusively] aware of themselves ...'.

[Objection] Why say that a cognition, because it is aware of itself cannot be cognized by other cognitions (2)? There is no contradiction between these two aspects. Though a cognition shines with its own light (*svayaṃ prakāśate*) — because its essence is light — yet, if it illuminates a cognition present in another subject, this occurs because cognitions have the capacity to illuminate themselves and what is other than themselves (*ātmānātmaprakāśanasāmarthyāt*); and just as — amidst what is other than themselves — an inert reality is illuminated, in the same way another cognition may be illuminated, even if its very essence is light. And also that cognition, which thus becomes illuminated, is illuminated by another cognition while it in turn illuminates what is other than itself, for instance the colour blue etc. This is precisely the way in which a direct perception comes to be illuminated [i.e. cognized] by that form of

(1) That is, as the illumination of an entity conceived as separate from it.

(2) Here there begins a long objection to the doctrine of the non-objectifiability of cognition, an objection expressed from the point of view of a Naiyāyika.

cognition which is memory, or in which a cognition and its object, belonging to another subject, is cognized by the superhuman cognition of a yogi. It is in these terms that the cognition is presented in its true nature, neither is it to be feared that, because it is the object of another cognition, the cognition ceases to be such and becomes similar to an inert reality, like a jar. In fact, in the case of the cognition, being illuminated is something that is able in turn to illuminate, whereas the same thing may not be said of the jar. An inert reality is not such because it is subject to being illuminated by other, neither is consciousness such for the opposite reason. And this is because the object's being illuminated is not an element that intimately concerns its own form, but rather that of the cognizing subject, for in this case — as it has been said — there would be no restriction as regards the cognizing subject. Just as the jar is manifested thanks to a light belonging to the cognizing subject (*pramātṛsambandhinā prakāśena*), which is what ascertains its nature as sentient or insentient, so the cognition, too, is manifested to [another] subject not by virtue of a light of its own (*na svaprakāśena*) — for that would entail its being manifested anyway, even, that is, to an insentient reality —, but through the light of another cognition. What renders the object of illumination such is the light of cognition (3). Therefore, we can say that the object of the perception 'jar' shines in that form of cognition which is memory precisely in as much as also the light of the perception itself is made to shine. Its light, in fact, is constituted by the light of another cognition (*tatprakāśa eva hi paraprakāśaḥ*).

Thus cognition, insofar as it is by nature light and illumination of the other, shines itself and can illuminate the other — whether it is sentient or insentient; cognition, too, which is in its very essence illuminating of this own nature, may be illuminated by another cognition, which in turn is able to illuminate itself and what is other than itself. In stating this there is therefore no fault (4).

[Reply] Just as the jar or the cloth can be said to be manifested in their true nature when, respectively, a form having a broad base and belly or a form with a certain length and width appear, and otherwise cannot, so cognition is grasped in its own reality if it appears as capable of illuminating the other, being at the same time self-luminous, because its form is solely this. Even if it were admitted that it may be cognized by another cognition, its being self-luminous could not, in any way, be illuminated. Its being self-luminous means, in actual fact, that it is not a different thing from the light of the cognizer; it means being able to be the object of the notion of 'I'.

Therefore its real nature would not be respected if it were presented in terms

(3) And when it is a cognition that is the object of illumination, what renders it such is precisely the light of another cognition.

(4) The cognition — Abh. notes, developing the argumentation of the objector — does not lose any of its nature when it becomes the object of another cognition, as happens when a mirror is reflected in another mirror that is just as clear (IPVV I p. 256 yat yatra na lakṣaṇaṃ svam apabhādate, tat tatra [na] viruddhaṃ darpaṇasvacchatāyām iva svacchadarpaṇasaṃkrāntiḥ).

of objectification 'here is this cognition'; consciousness (*bodho*), in fact, is illuminated only by itself and is able to shine, completely autonomously, as 'I' (*aham ity eva*) ([5]). This light of consciousness is called cognition, when it is turned outwards, towards objects, and is [apparently] differentiated because of them. When it is turned inwards, it is then called the cognizing subject himself.

The Buddhists say the same thing except that they consider the permanence of the subject as being uniquely the product of a wrongful superimposition brought about by discursive thought (*vikalpāropitasthairyaḥ*). Also the followers of Sāṃkhyā attribute to the intellect (*buddhau*) — which alone in effect appears in experience ([6]) — this dual nature. Also in the view of those ([7]) who consider the cognizing subject as something distinct from the light of cognition, cognition ends up by shining as undifferentiated from the subject, because it is indissolubly inherent in it; otherwise there would be no cognition at all. In fact, the universal that exists separately from the particular is no longer such, and knowing it in these terms does not mean knowing it for what it is. Also when it is an omniscient subject who knows it, the universal can only be manifested as that which 'colours' the single particular realities (*svalakṣaṇoparañjakatvenaiva*) ([8]). Similarly, the true nature of cognition may be said to shine only if it shines as having its essence in the light of the I; cognition, for its part, is nothing but the light of the I turned towards objects (*viṣayonmukhāhaṃprakāśamātrarūpaṃ*), without any specific form of its own other than this. Thus an ultimate basis for the determinations of the objects of cognition may exist thanks to the autonomy of cognition due to the fact that it does not depend on a light from outside itself. If this itself ([9]) does not come to light, what else would remain of what is manifested in it?

Therefore grasping cognition in terms of 'this' is not a direct, primary datum of our experience (*na sākṣāt pratītaṃ bhavati*); on the basis of the argument already exposed above, it is grasped as 'this' only through the mediation of the light of the I (*ahaṃprakāśavyavadhānena*), similarly to what occurs when one thinks of the cognizer

([5]) Cf. *Ibid.* p. 257 evagrahaṇena ananyāpekṣām āha.

([6]) Cf. *ibid.* p. 258 mukhyayā iti na vāstavam atra mukhyatvam, api tu pratibhāsānusāreṇeti.

([7]) E.g. the Naiyāyikas.

([8]) The omniscient — Abh. notes (*ibid.* p. 259) — is able to contemplate the six categories — one of which is the universal (*jāti*) — individually, and therefore also the universal separately. Furthermore, during the *mahāpralaya*, he must be able to contemplate the universals also in the absence of the particular realities, which at that moment have dissolved. If the omniscient subject, even in this state, manages to see the universals in what is their nature — and this cannot be doubted — this is because he can see directly, thanks to his power, the past and future particular realities. In fact, the universals are such insofar as they constitute the unifying motif of the single particulars, thus producing the notion of unity with regard to elements that are differentiated (bhinneṣu abinnapratyayajanakatvaṃ hi jāter jīvitam).

([9]) That is, the own form of cognition as being the light of the I turned towards objects.

'this is the self' (10). Thus on the basis of the immediate experience and in conformity with that which is its peculiar form, cognition is absolutely not knowable by another cognition, precisely because it is cognition and its essence is self-awareness.

It is on these very bases that the definition of 'sentient' and 'insentient', being thus manifested, can be settled. 'Insentient' is, therefore, that whose light depends on other (*parādhīnaprakāśam*); its opposite, 'sentient' is that which is self-illuminating, constituted by the light of the I; or, the object of illumination, whose light depends on other, that is called 'insentient'.

[Objection] This definition of 'insentient' as 'that which is to be illuminated' does not concern its own form at all. Being the object of illumination does not constitute the own form of the object; this light, in fact, belongs to the cognizing subject. And, on the other hand, a definition that does not invest the own form (*svarūpāsaṃsparśi*) of what it defines is not a definition. Therefore, what is the object of illumination — and considered insentient for this reason —, though having a light that is dependent on other, would not be 'insentient' because of this. And furthermore, it would be derived from your definition that cognition, too — conceived as sentient — would be characterized by having a light depending on other, as it has been acknowledged as being the possible object of another cognition (11).

[Reply] However, the fact that the light of this cognition depends on other, involves its shining as 'this' (*idantayā*) and this *idantā* is, according to our way of conceiving (*adya*) (12), the own form of the object separate from light, therefore opposed to the self-luminosity constituted by the light of the I. There is, therefore, a sharp and firmly based (*suvyavasthitaḥ*) distinction between the definitions of 'sentient' and 'insentient'.

To say that at the time of the memory there is the direct presence of what was previously perceived means that the memory has become one with the previous perception (*anubhavaikyāpannam*). On the contrary, it is not admissible to think of a perception separated from the memory, being situated between the object and the memory of it (*antarālavartī*) (13), because, if its nature as light is not established,

(10) Cf. IPK I.5.17. Furthermore, all cognitions have their ultimate resting place in the I ('I am the perceiver, constituted by the illumination of the object'); cf. IPVV I, p. 261 idam iti prakāśasvātantryarūpād ahaṃbhāvāt pṛthakkṛtaṃ sat jñānaṃ yadā prakāśate, tadā ahaṃ jñātā viṣayaprakāśamayaḥ ity evambhūtāṃ pāryantikīṃ pratipattim adhiśayya prakāśitaṃ bhavati).

(11) This in the objector's eyes is another reason for criticising the definition of *jaḍa* proposed by the author. Not only does it not touch the own form of what it intends to define, but, even admitting that it does, the definitions of *jaḍa* and *ajaḍa* are not such that they are mutually exclusive (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 261-2) na kevalaṃ svarūpāsparśanāt yāvad abhyupagate'pi svarūpasparśitve | itaś cāvirodhāt jaḍājaḍalakṣaṇayoḥ prasaktāt jaḍam api ajaḍam syāt).

(12) Cf. *ibid.*, p. 262 adya iti asmaduktāyāṃ vyavasthāyāṃ.

(13) That is to say in such a way that the recollection illuminates a perception which in turn illuminates the object.

neither is its capacity to illuminate the other (*prakāśarūpatvāsiddhau paraprakāśakatvasyāpy asiddheḥ*). In effect, in saying 'illuminates, makes the other manifest' (*paraṃ prakāśayati*) it is not in the other that a further qualification (*atiśayaḥ*) is produced, but only in the light [14]. Thus, as the self-luminosity of the previous perception has not been proved — since in order to be manifested it depends on other, appearing as 'this' — it is not possible to state that its nature is light. And thus, in the state of Īśvara, things, which, appearing as 'this', are insentient, then achieve — once they come to be in the situation of identity of substratum with the light of the I (*ahaṃprakāśasāmānādhikaraṇyena*) [15] — their own form as light, whose essence is the cognizer. In this condition there is no addition (*nādhikyaṃ kiṃcit*) to the nature of consciousness, just as a new configuration of a certain form does not constitute another entity, since it continues to have its ultimate reality in the form. When this configuration lapses, this does not mean that the form lapses, since it lies in it, not even when the new configuration occurs is there any addition to the form, since another entity is not produced. All that may be said is that on the various planes of the new configurations the form appears in various ways, insofar as it becomes endowed with further qualifications (*sātiśayasya bhāvāt*). But not even this may be applied to the nature of consciousness, because there is no room in it for further qualifications (*na tv evam api bodharūpe kaścid atiśayaḥ sambhavati*) [16]. Īśvara, even if his essence is all, is not different from pure consciousness (*na cinmātratāyā atiricyate*). But let us cease these argumentations.

It has therefore been proved that being conscious of itself [on the part of cognition] is pervaded by the light of the I, which is opposed to insentience — and insentience, for its part, has the nature of 'this', which pervades the property of being knowable by others. Thus it is possible to deny that the cognition is knowable by others, because this property is pervaded by another that is in opposition to the pervading one (*vyāpakaviruddhavyāptāyāḥ*) [17]. Similarly, in the case of sound etc., there is the negation of permanence, because sound possesses a causal efficiency in succession, which is pervaded by the fact of having a multiple nature, which is in turn contrary to the

(14) It is an allusion to the *prakaṭatāvāda* of the Mīmāṃsakas.

(15) See IPK III.1.3.

(16) The example adduced is, therefore, both a *sādharmya*° and a *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta*. The analogy between form and consciousness is valid as regards the absence in both of any *ādhikya*, but it stops there, because the *atiśaya* that is produced in the form is not admissible for consciousness.

(17) Utpaladeva is using both an argumentation and a terminology that are peculiar to the Buddhist logicians, to wit, the *anupalabdhi* as the *hetu* of a negative inference, here in the form of *vyāpakaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi*. This type does not appear in any of Dharmakīrti's three classifications of the *anupalabdhi* (in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, the *Hetubindu* and the *Nyāyabindu*) and is mentioned for the first time, in the extant Buddhist literature, in Durvekamiśra's *Dharmottarapradīpa*, included in a classification into fourteen or sixteen forms (Kajiyama 1966: 151 ff.). The evidence of the *Ṭīkā* shows that this tradition was already current in the Buddhist circles at least in Utpaladeva's time.

unity, that pervades permanence; also in the case of the jar there is the negation of self-awareness, since the property of being knowable by others is perceived, and this in turn is pervaded by a property that is in opposition to the pervading one ([18]).

This being the case, even if all is perceived, it becomes impossible to grasp in the object its having been the object of another cognition, since cognitions are incapable of being aware of one another (*jñānānām anyonyasaṃvedanābhāvāt*), it having been excluded that they can be the object of other cognitions. On the other hand, taking or leaving a certain thing depends precisely on the awareness of having had a previous experience of that thing with particular results. If one could only count on the present cognition (*vartamānajñānamātreṇa*), this would be impossible and, therefore, for those who turn to things with particular objectives all practical activity (*vyavahāraḥ*) — which is based on this taking or leaving (*tyāgopādānamayo*) — would be impossible. This is meant by the *vṛtti*, when it says '... with one another ...'. The genitive *jñānānām* ('of cognitions') in the *sūtra* requires *anusaṃdhāna*° ('unification') and in the *vṛtti* requires *viṣayasaṅghaṭanā*° ('connection of the objects'); however, notwithstanding this, word-composition takes place, because these words invariably show requirement (*nityasāpekṣatvāt*) ([19]).

The same applies to the teaching of the true reality by those who have personally experienced it (*viditavedyair*) ([20]). The process is as follows: first there is the direct experience of that reality, then the reflective awareness of it (along with its discursive articulation) and finally it is taught to the disciple. This would not be possible if each cognition were limited to itself and its respective object (*svātmaviṣayamātra*°), and thus

([18]) The being knowable by others (*parasaṃvedyatā*) is pervaded by the notion of 'this', which is opposed to the notion of 'I', which in turn pervades self-awareness (cf. IPVV I, p. 267). The first of the two examples (as Abhinavagupta develops it) 'Sound is impermanent, because its causal efficiency is in succession' must have been the stock example, since it is the one used also by Durvekamiśra, Mokṣākaragupta and Vidyākaraśānti (Kajiyama 1966: 152).

([19]) A condition for word-composition is the absence of any external requirement (*Mahābhāṣya* vol. I, p. 360, *ad* Pāṇini II.1.1, sāpekṣam asamarthaṃ bhavati; cf. Joshi 1968: 33 ff.). In other words, the single members of a compound cannot be related with, or qualified by, an outside word. This statement is, then, questioned and lastly restricted by Patañjali only to the subordinate member — except in some cases. One of these cases — pointed out later by Bhartṛhari — is represented by the so-called 'correlative' words, that is, words which by their very nature require other words to complete meaning (cf. *Vākyapadīya* III.14.47 saṃbandhiśabdaḥ sāpekṣo nityaṃ sarvaḥ prayujyate / svārthavat sā vyapekṣasya vṛttāv api na hīyate). Therefore, although between *jñānānām* and *anusaṃdhāna*°, and *teṣām* (*jñānānām*) and *viṣaya*° there is *sāpekṣatva* — that is, a mutual requirement —, this does not prevent the formation of the compounds *anusaṃdhānajanmā* and *viṣayasaṅghaṭanāmayaḥ*, for in the case of both *anusaṃdhāna* and *viṣaya* there is an inherent, constant (*nitya*) requirement of something else — the former being a transitive action noun, which implies an object, and the latter being strictly connected with *jñāna* as its correlative term.

([20]) This teaching, too, requires the coordination and unification of cognitions of different natures and belonging to diverse times.

all cognizers would be reduced to paralysis. That is meant by the *vṛtti*, when it says: '... of the highest reality ...'. If the teaching of the highest reality were erroneous, then the supreme reality would not be attained; if, on the contrary, there were a definite attainment, in spite of all, thanks to this error, then this would not be a real error, seeing that it possesses this capacity. This process of the teaching of the highest reality is not a mere causal process (*kāraṇamātram*) (21), but a cognitive activity (*pratītiḥ*), and if the object of the past and future cognition of the highest reality (22) were not the same as these series of cognitive processes, then how could one on these grounds promote a definite activity culminating with the full attainment of such reality? Thus the world of practical experience, that has a single well defined basis, would not be possible if there were no unification of cognitions.

And, on the contrary, this world of practical experience is explained if there is a single essence (*eka evātmā*) of all these cognitive acts — perceptions, recollections etc. — in that they are all constituted in the final analysis by pure consciousness, and if these cognitions etc. represent the various and multiform powers of this single Self, Parameśvara, whose essence is all. This world of practical experience would otherwise not be possible.

'... if there were no Maheśvara which contains within himself all the infinite forms, one, whose essence is consciousness, possessing the power of cognition, memory and exclusion.' IPK I.3.7

(*Vṛtti*) — The reciprocal unification of all cognitions of things is [constituted by] the principle of consciousness whose form is all, since nothing different from it is admissible. It has been said: 'From me derive memory, cognition, exclusion'.

(*Vivṛti*) — The principle of consciousness, consisting of light and creativity, is established from the beginning (*ādisiddham eva*). If objects, presumed to be inert realities, were different from it, that would mean that their nature is in itself non-light, and in this case they would not be able to shine [that is, be manifested]. In

(21) The implicit objection (which may be attributed to a Buddhist) to which the *ṭīkā* is replying, is, according to Abh. (IPVV I, pp. 270-71), the following. The various stages of the teaching process can be understood simply as a concatenation of causes and effects (experience — reflective awareness and conceptualization — teaching — application to *bhāvanā* — accomplishment of it — attainment of supreme reality) without it being necessary to pose the problem of the combination of the objects of the single cognitive acts, as, on the contrary, Utp. does — in order to make recourse to the unifying dynamism of the I inevitable. A mere cause-effect relation cannot be invoked here, because it is not a question of inert realities — such as the seed and the shoot, or the clay and the jar — but of various types of cognitive processes, which, if set in the framework of causal automatism, would be transformed into self-contained things.

(22) The experience that the master has personally had is past, the knowledge that his teaching will permit his disciples to attain is future.

fact, a light that is by nature non-white, cannot become white. This will be demonstrated later. This is meant by the *vṛtti*, when it says: '... the principle of consciousness ...' and '... different from it ...'.

If therefore things, though they are manifested as separate, have as their single nature consciousness, it is all the more certain that cognitions — whose object they are — also have this nature. In effect, cognitions are not manifested separately from their objects (*na hi tāni tato bhedena prathante*), nevertheless, though they are apparently differentiated since they are invested with the differentiation that is peculiar to their object (*viṣayabhedāvakalpitabhedānām api*), yet they ultimately rest — despite this spatio-temporal determination — on their own nature consisting of unitary consciousness (*ekacinmayasvabhāvaviśrāntir eva*). If it were not so, and the various cognitions did not have as their ultimate nature the principle of consciousness, introverted, in the form of a unitary self-awareness, how could one, at the moment when the cognition of an empty surface is produced, arrive at the statement 'there is no jar here (lit. 'this is not the cognition of a surface with a jar') (*saghaṭapradeśajñānaṃ nāsti*)? Cognitions, in fact, are each a light unto themselves and cannot therefore combine to form a single cognition which has as its object the jar etc. (*ghaṭādiviṣayavadekajñānasaṃsargitvābhāv-āt*) (23). [...]

['(He who remembers) must necessarily, having a reflective awareness of the particular entity formerly made manifest, make it manifest at the actual moment of the memory, either as a single manifestation or as the whole of its components.' IPK I.4.2

(*Vṛtti*) — Thanks to the power of memory the subject, when having a reflective

(23) This subject will be dealt with in detail later (IPK I.7.7-11). Utpaladeva is here referring to the Buddhist theory of *abhāva* and *anupalabdhi*, as delineated by Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara (Torella, forthcoming B). The cognition of the absence of the jar, though being in itself distinct from that of the empty surface, is essentially connected with it, just as judgement is linked to perception and represents the subsequent stage: the same cognitive act entails both of them (cf. *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, pp. 122-23). Dharmottara here depends directly on Dharmakīrti, who has extensively debated the question in several of his works (*Pramāṇavārttika* and *svavṛtti*, *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, *Hetubindu*, *Nyāyabindu*). The essential point of Dharmakīrti's conception may be summarized as follows (I refer to *Hetubindu*, pp. 21-28). Non-perception is not a distinct *pramāṇa* connected with its own particular *prameya* (*abhāva*), as for instance Kumārila maintains. It consists in a positive perception of something that exists — a perception and object that, however, are other than the cognizer's expectation (*anyopalabdhi*, *anyābhāva*, *vivakṣitopalabdher anyatvāt*) and in this way reveal an absence. From the positive perception of an 'other' thing one may pass to the cognition of the absence of the thing intended only on determinate conditions: first of all, that the two things possess an equal capacity to suscitate a certain cognition (*aviśiṣṭayogyatā*; cf. *tulyayogyatā* at the very end of this fragment) and that therefore they are necessarily associated in a single cognitive act (*ekajñānasaṃsargitva*), so that, if this cognitive act takes place and only one of the two things is perceived, this means that the other is absent. Utpaladeva will give an elaborate answer to this argument in IPK I.7.9 and *vṛtti*.

awareness as 'that' of the particular entity which had been formerly perceived, must make it manifest [in the present], for there could not be a reflective awareness of an object made manifest [in the past only]; and this manifestation takes place at the very moment of the act of remembering. Therefore it is not wrong to affirm the manifestation — at the moment of the memory — of an object which, however, is no longer present at that moment. At certain times the object presents itself in the form of a single manifestation, that is, limited to one of the many manifestations that compose it, such as — in the case of a jar — 'jar' 'golden' 'individual substance' 'existence' etc., depending on the subject's intentions. In these cases its manifestation in memory is distinct and vivid. At other times, on the contrary, the object presents itself in its totality, since this is the subject's intention; its manifestation is equally distinct, as in the previous case. And finally, the subject whose mind is intensely concentrated without interruption even directly visualizes the object formerly perceived.]

(*Vivṛti*) — [...] In autonomous mental elaborations (*svatantravikalpeṣu*) ([24]) the object, in its universal form, is manifested in a way that is devoid of vividness. In fact, many universals when combined and set in a relationship of mutual determination (*anyonyāvacchedena*) reach a level of manifestation that is wholly vivid (*sphuṭābhāsatām āsādya*), and become in the end, once they are delimited by universals such as space and so on, particular realities (*svalakṣaṇatāṃ bhajante*). Treeness (*vṛkṣatvam*), which yet is one, in its universal form — consisting exclusively of being endowed with branches etc. —, once it is combined with a whole variety of universals of colour and shape, such as those of the *dhava* or the *khadira* trees, and differentiated by a myriad of combinations with the manifestations of the universals of space and time, becomes many (*anekātmatām āpadyate*). Even if they themselves (*svayam*) are exempt from spatio-temporal differentiations, universals give rise to a multiplicity of particular realities by virtue of their being different one from the other and of their mutually determining one another now in one way now in another (*parasparaṃ paryāyāvacchedaś ca*) ([25]). This mutual determination must respond to a criterion of compatibility (*ānuguṇyena*) and therefore cannot take place, for instance, in the case of the universals 'cold' and 'fire', which do not possess this compatibility.

([24]) Utp. calls 'autonomous' (*svatantra*) those *vikalpas*, such as imagination or fantasy, which do not depend directly — like, for instance, determinate cognition (*adhyavasāya*) or recollection — on a previous perception (cf. *vṛtti ad* IPK I.8.2).

([25]) The individual *ābhāsas* do not possess a status of *avacchedaka* or *avacchedya* of their own, but they can assume either the one or the other according to the circumstances. They are not associated — Abh. says (IPVV II, p. 26) — remaining on the same plane, like the members of a *dvandva*, but in a relationship of principal-secondary, qualifying-qualified. The *ābhāsa* 'cloth', in a piece of white cloth, may appear predominant to a subject who, at that particular moment, is interested in the object as something to protect himself with; on the contrary, the *ābhāsa* 'white' will appear predominant, if he is thinking of the capacity the colour white has to confer serenity on the soul (cf. *Pramāṇavārttika*, I.58 and *svavṛtti*).

Then there are certains universals which, even without entering into relations of determination with others, are themselves (*svata eva*) manifested in a clear and evident manner (*sphuṭaṃ bhavati*), without this entailing their transformation into particular realities (*svalakṣaṇatām anāpannam api*), but only thanks to the multiplicity of universals that they — in their unity — encompass (*anekasāmānyamayaikasāmānyātmatayā*). For example, this is the case of the universal '*dhava*' with respect to the universal 'tree'. The former, though not being particularized as regards its own nature, contains within itself other universals such as tree etc. (*tadantaḥpraviṣṭavṛkṣatvādi*). This does not mean that they cease to be universals (*sāmānyatāṃ na tu jāhaty eva*), because to become a particular they must be determined by a spatio-temporal differentiation. When, however, depending on the subject's requirement (*arthitāvaśenaiva*), the object is remembered as associated with the manifestation of a previous time and place along with the perception of many manifestations such as 'golden' 'red' etc., then it will be manifested as vivid and clear (*sphuṭa evābhāsaḥ*) (26). That is meant by the *vṛtti*, when it says: '... at other times, on the contrary ...'. Sometimes, then, when one is intent on remembering with an especially intense concentration (*atyantaikarasāvadhānodyuktasya*), the object being remembered, rendered clear and limpid by referring to it all its attributs — excluding none — (*niravaśeṣaviśeṣaṇāvabhāsasāmānādhikaraṇyāpattiviśadīkṛtaḥ*), manifestly appears before one (*sphuṭaṃ puraḥ sphurati*), animated by a direct perception (*sākṣātkāramaya eva*) (27). That is meant by the *vṛtti*, when it says: '... intensely ... without interruption ...'. The absence of interruption or distraction (*nairantaryam*) in the concentration is its being free from impurities, the absence in it of the occurrence of extraneous thoughts. And in this case, despite the fact that there is direct perception, the object perceived in the past is preserved (*anubhūtaviṣayāsaṃpramoṣaḥ*) (28), since one has the direct experience of the object [not insofar as it is present but] in that it has been previously known (*pūrvadṛṣṭatayaiva*). Therefore it is not at all incongruous to include this type of experience among the various forms of memory (*smṛtibhedamadhyagaṇanāyāṃ na kṣatiḥ*).

Also when the autonomous mental elaboration (29) turns to the manifestation of something that has been proved beyond any doubt by the various means of right knowledge and distinguished by many attributs (*tattatpramāṇapariśuddhānekaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthāvabhāsonmukhaḥ*), then the object becomes clear and vivid (*sphuṭībhavaty eva*). In fact it has been said: 'Since he is engaged in listening or speaking about the Brahman etc.'. We are not interested here in whether this experience is discursive thought or not. On the other hand, at no moment may we speak of the absence of

(26) Despite the fact that it occurs in the sphere of the memory.

(27) It is remembered, that is, as clearly as if it were directly perceived.

(28) This is the classical definition of memory (*Yogasūtra* I.11 anubhūtaviṣayāsaṃpramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ).

(29) Thus the above considerations apply not only to the 'dependent' *vikalpas*, like memory, but also to those called 'autonomous' (*svatantra*), like imagination.

reflective awareness (*parāmarśaśūnyatā*), because this is the essence of all lights (of cognition) (*tādātmyāt sarvaprakāśānām*) (30). Every experience, such as memory etc., is centred on the freedom of the principle of consciousness and is not simply produced thanks to the power of its particular immediate cause (*svakāraṇasāmarthyāt*). It is in order to teach this that the *vṛtti* uses the causative (*ṇicā nirdeśaḥ*) in the expression '*pūrvābhāsita*' (31). [...]

['The cognitions (of the others) are not manifested as the object even in that particular cognition which is characteristic of the yogis. The only means of knowing them is self-awareness. What has been stated also applies if they are admitted as the object of cognition'. IPK I.4.5

(*Vṛtti*) — For the omniscient, too, the cognitions belonging to other subjects — which can be known only through self-awareness — must always be manifested as resting on their own self; and, therefore, what in reality happens (*tattvam*) is in point of fact the identification on the part of these yogis with the self of others. Should one attribute [to the cognitions of others] the nature of knowable object, such as the jar etc., they would have to be manifested each in their own form of pure consciousness, whereas that is impossible.

(*Vivṛti*) — ...] Then (32) [as regards cognition] it could not be said that awareness is exclusively peculiar to it (*svaiva saṃvit*), nor that it [cognition] is only awareness of itself (*svasya tat saṃvid eva*), but, on the contrary, that the awareness of itself [i.e. of that cognition itself] also pertains to other cognitions [and to the cognitions of other subjects] (*parāpy asya saṃvit*) — since its illumination depends on other —, and that it is also non-awareness (*asaṃvid api ca*), because this is the characteristic of inert reality (33).

(30) This is one of the central points of Pratyabhijñā philosophy. See its classical formulation in IPK I.5.11 and *vṛtti* svabhāvam avabhāsasya vimarśaṃ vidur anyathā / prakāśo 'rthoparakto'pi sphaṭikādijaḍopamaḥ // — prakāśasya mukhya ātmā pratyavamarśas taṃ vinārthabheditākārāsyāpy asya svacchatāmātraṃ na tv ajāḍyaṃ camatkṛter abhāvat. The indebtment to Bhartṛhari's thought (cf. in particular *Vākyapadīya* I.116 vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabhodasya śāsvatī / na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī //) is evident.

(31) Utpaladeva and, after him, Abhinavagupta have dwelt at length on the pregnant meaning to be attributed to the use of the causative form in these contexts (Torella 1987).

(32) What follows is presumably what would derive from the admission of the objectifiability of cognition; cf. also IPVV II, p. 44 caturvidhaniyamaniyantritarūpāvabhāsaś ca jñānasya jñānāntaravedyatāyāṃ vighaṭata iti.

(33) If the objectifiability of cognition were admitted, all four ways in which one may understand the expression *svasaṃvit* used in the *kārikā* to characterize cognition (*svaiva saṃvit, svasya saṃvid eva, svā saṃvid eva, svasyaiva saṃvit*; Utp. considers them all equally acceptable) would be reversed (*parāpi*

[Objection] But then we can explain the thing simply like this: the cognition belonging to a certain subject, which has come to be in contact with another — that is, a yogi —, is spontaneously (*svayam eva*) manifested to this yogi. In this way, the definition that has been given of cognition would not be violated (*jñānalakṣaṇātikramo na syāt*).

[Reply] Not even this explanation is valid, since the relation [of the cognition] with the other is not admissible (*pareṇa saha sambandhāyogāt*).

Furthermore, cognition may have as its basis the object (*viṣayālambanam*) only by virtue of its conformity (*sārūpyeṇa*) with it and this conformity of the cognition with the object — such as, for instance, the colour blue — occurs through the imitation of the object (*tadanukāreṇa*). This presupposes its diversity from cognition. Conformity, in fact, is admissible only if based on a combination of difference and non-difference (*bhedābhedanibandhanam*), and, on the contrary, between two cognitions, assumed to be subject and object (*viṣayaviṣayiṇor*), there is only non-difference (*abheda eva*), since they are both characterized solely by consciousness (*ekabodhamātralakṣaṇatvāt*). Therefore there does not exist between them conformity — which is the essential nucleus of something being an object (*na sārūpyam ālambanārtho*) —, but only unity. There may exist a mutual conformity between two mirrors, since they are differentiated from every point of view (*sarvarūpavailakṣaṇyāt*) ([34]). Between two cognitions, on the contrary, there cannot even be a differentiation caused by an intrinsic connection with a particular time and place, distinct from the consciousness which is their common nature (*bodharūpatātirikto*). Furthermore, only when a cognition conforms to a thing in that which is effectively its own form (*yad yathābhūtaṃ tadrūpeṇaiva jñānaṃ tadākāram*) can it be said it has that as its object; conversely, it cannot be said that cognition has blue as its object, if this blue of which it assumes the form does not exclude non-blue. Thus another cognition could be said legitimately to have assumed conformity [with a certain cognition] (*tulyākāram eva syāt*), only if that occurs with a cognition that has solely the nature of apprehender, that excludes that of apprehended (*grāhyavyavacchinnagrāhakaikasvabhāvena jñānena*). In fact, if a cognition applied itself to the other only in one part [the 'apprehender' part], in this case alone the own form of the latter would be preserved. Thus there would be a subject-object relation between the two cognitions (*viṣayaviṣayibhāvaḥ*), but only through their becoming one ([35]).

saṃvit, svasya asaṃvid api, svā asaṃvid api, parasya api saṃvit). The last of these — Abh. notes (*ibid.*, pp. 44-45) — is the only one that is not taken into consideration, both because it is not relevant to what one intends to prove, and because having an awareness also of the other does not constitute a characteristic of insentience.

([34]) That is to say, as regards their place, time and own form (*ibid.*, p. 46 darpaṇayos tu deśakālasvarūpātmakaṃ sarvam eva vilakṣaṇam).

([35]) In cognition two aspects are to be singled out: an 'apprehender' part and an 'apprehended' part. The former represents its intrinsic being (*svātma*), whereas the latter is a superimposition caused by ignorance and discursive thought. For one to be able to say that a cognition knows another cognition

This is meant by the *vṛtti*, when it says: '... as resting on their own self ...'. The own self of cognition is its 'apprehender' part (*grāhakāṃśaḥ*); on the contrary, the body etc. relative to another subject appear in the cognition of the omniscient in terms of separation, as being the 'apprehended' part (*grāhyāṃśa eva*). It is in this very sense that the common formulation 'the cognition of the omniscient concerns the penetration into the sphere of another being' is to be understood (36).

However, once the plane of authentic (*vāstavena*) subjectivity has been reached, whose essence is solely consciousness, for the omniscient the cognition of the other's self (*parātmavedanam*) is nothing but the attainment of unity with the other cognizer (*pramātrantaraikyāpattir eva*). Nevertheless, though united with another subject, the omniscient does not find himself sharing the other's pleasure or pain, because pleasure and pain cannot enter the authentic cognizer, in which solely the I shines, characterized only by consciousness. It is only in the subject in the power of māyā — who, identified as he is with the intellect, is connected with the notions of 'I' and 'this' — that pleasure and pain have room; but this will be spoken of later. For this very reason those who have transcended the role of limited apprehender (*grāhakabhūmikottīrṇānām*) and risen to the state of authentic cognizer (*vāstavapramātṛsamāpannānām*), even if they have experience of pleasure and pain brought about by their various causes, do not become for this pleased or pained (*na sukhitvādi*), or the pleasure and pain do not arise because their causes are incomplete (*hetuvaikalyāt*) 37). In this state innate bliss arises (*sahajānandāvirbhāvaḥ*). Also in the case of the direct perception of other previous births [...] (38).

rightly, it is necessary that the former grasps the latter in its true aspect, which is that of 'apprehender'. But this is manifestly impossible, because it would entail the unification of the two terms (both being *grāhaka*), which, on the contrary, in the relationship *viṣaya-viṣayin* here examined, must necessarily be differentiated.

(36) Although one cannot speak, in the absolute sense, of objectification of cognition and the case of the yogi can be explained — as has already been hinted at and will be explicitly stated later — by the identification of the yogi with the other subject, yet the common interpretation of this phenomenon is not to be simply excluded. It has a relative validity, with reference to the yogi not having yet fully attained the highest plane, who, although identified with the cognition of the other, still feels the power that the body etc. of the other have to condition and limit the plane of the real subjectivity (cf. *ibid.*, p. 49).

(37) In the former case, pleasure and pain do arise, but the subject does not identify himself with them. In the latter, they do not arise at all, because the subject is on a plane where even the *saṃskāras* that keep him bound to the body, the mind and so on have been loosened, and, without the cooperation of the elements forming the limited individuality, the set of causes which gives rise to pleasure or pain is no longer complete and loses all power (cf. *ibid.*, p. 49).

(38) As Abhinavagupta sums up (*ibid.*, p. 42), three cases of apparent objectification of cognition, all of them ascribed to the yogis, are treated in the *ṭīkā*. They can be formulated respectively as 'I know this in another subject', 'I had that experience while being in another body and in a previous birth' and 'I remember a thing in the same terms in which it was previously known by another'. The present fragment of the *ṭīkā* stops at the very beginning of the treatment of the second case.

ABBREVIATIONS

IPK	*Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā*
IPVṛ	*Īśvarapratyabhijñāvṛtti*
IPV	*Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*
IPVV	*Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*
KSTS	Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies

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